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NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS BY THE FORMER
EMPLOYEE: A FLORIDA LAW SURVEY AND ANALYSIS
KENDALL B. COFFEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The employee's covenant not to compete' against his former em-
ployer is a promise often unenforced in most American courts.2
Before the 1953 enactment of section 542.12, Florida Statutes,"
such a covenant made in Florida was also frequently not given ef-
fect. Although Florida courts had the discretionary power to en-
force covenants not to compete, discretionary enforcement gener-
ally translated into nonenforcement of these covenants. In
response, the Florida legislature provided express statutory author-
ization for the enforcement of covenants not to compete in section
542.12. Although generally Florida courts faithfully apply this leg-
islative mandate for enforcement of "noncompete agreements,"' 4
certain limitations have been created to curtail the potential bur-
den imposed by such agreements. Furthermore, recent judicial pro-
nouncements reflect a possible disenchantment with the previous
pattern of rigid appellate enforcement 5 which left little room for
discretion in hardship cases.
Since the substantial case law construing section 542.12 and the
recent developments which foreshadow a shift in the type of en-
forcement that can be anticipated in the future has not been col-
lected and analyzed, this article will survey the case law and ex-
plore and analyze the status of developments and possible conflicts
with regards to noncompetition agreements in Florida. It will con-
clude with a summary and recommendation.
* B.S. 1975, University of Florida; J.D. 1978, University of Florida; Law Clerk, Honorable
Lewis R. Morgan, Circuit Judge, U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, 1978; Member of the
Florida Bar and Dade County Bar Association; Associate, Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Li-
poff, Quentel & Wolff, Miami, Florida.
1. 53 AM. JUR. 2d Master & Servant § 106 (1970); BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 327, 329 (5th
ed. 1979); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 95 (1978).
2. E.g., Moore v. Dwoskin, Inc., 177 S.E.2d 708 (Ga. 1970); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 320
N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. 1971).
3. (1979).
4. E.g., Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1974); Flammer v. Patton,
245 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1971).
5. See Uni-Chem Corp. v. Maret, 338 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Troup v.
Heacock, 367 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Damsey v. Mankowitz, 339 So. 2d 282
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). See also U Shop Rite, Inc. v. Richard's Paint Mfg. Co., 369 So.
2d 1033 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Prior to 1953, Florida shared the common law antipathy of most
jurisdictions towards noncompetition agreements given by an em-
ployee to his employer.a Indeed, courts viewed noncompetition
agreements in employment contracts far more harshly than restric-
tive covenants given by the seller of a business to the new owner.
Whereas the courts tested the restraint imposed by the restrictive
covenant simply against a standard of reasonableness in light of all
attendant circumstances,7 they invariably voided noncompetition
agreements as contravening public policy.' This traditional hostil-
ity was anchored in a number of factors; among then, the desire to
keep people productive, the fear that the employee and his family
might become public charges because of his inability to work, the
courts' aversion towards granting relief which effectively coerced
specific performance, and the assumption that noncompetition
agreements were unfair and worked undue hardship on the em-
ployee.' In the mid-1950's, the Florida Supreme Court noted that
not a single Florida decision had ever enforced noncompetition
agreements against former employees and that they had "generally
been stricken down for 'lack of mutuality' ".10 In Florida the chief
concern of the courts with regard to noncompetition agreements
was that competition which served the public would be unneces-
sarily hampered by enforcing these agreements and that the em-
ployee and his family would become public charges as a result of
enforcement.11
The common law enmity towards noncompetition agreements,
however, resulted in severe problems for employers. They quickly
discovered there was no secure legal device that could be used to
limit the competitive advantage enjoyed by a former employee.
6. See West Shore Restaurant Corp. v. Turk, 101 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1958); United Loan
Corp. v. Weddle, 77 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1955); Wilson v. Pigue, 10 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1942); Love
v. Miami Laundry Co., 160 So. 32 (Fla. 1934).
7. Arond v. Grossman, 75 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1954). In Arond, the court enforced the
noncompete agreement by finding that the offender was a former director of the plaintiff
corporation. As a former fiduciary, he was bound by his promise to the corporation. See
generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 59 (1955).
8. Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 160 So. 32, 34 (Fla. 1934).
9. United Loan Corp. v. Weedle, 77 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1955); Love v. Miami Laundry
Co., 160 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. 1934).
10. Arond v. Grossman, 75 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1954) (case arose prior to effective date
of Florida's noncompetition statute).
11. Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 160 So. 32, 34 (Fla. 1934).
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Section 542.12 was enacted to provide a solution to this problem.13
With the passage of section 542.12, the longstanding judicial re-
sentment of noncompetition agreements was legislatively relieved.
The first subsection of the statute nevertheless codifies the tradi-
tional hostility against trade restraints. It states: "(1) Every con-
tract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profes-
sion, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than is provided by
subsections (2) and (3) hereof, is to that extent void."'"
Carving a crucial exception to this broad proscription against
trade restraints, however, the second subsection provides:
One who is employed as an agent or employee may agree with his
employer, to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar
business and from soliciting old customers of such employer
within a reasonably limited time and area .... so long as such
employer continues to carry on a like business therein. 4
Thus, while generally invalidating trade restraints, the statute ex-
pressly authorizes the enforcement of noncompetition agreements
against an employee competing against his old employer.
In 1959, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional-
ity of the second subsection over objections that it violated due
process by depriving a man of his livelihood."5 Previously, most
cases had already firmly established a judicial commitment toward
enforcing the statute. In Atlas Travel Service, Inc. v. Morelly,"
decided in 1957, the First District Court of Appeal acknowledged
the legislative change in policy toward noncompetition agreements
when the court noted that section 542.12(2) "clearly supersedes the
common-law rule.' 7 With respect to remedying noncompetition
agreement violations, the court stated that trial court discretion
regarding injunctive relief "shall be reasonably exercised to the
end that the object of the statute may not be nullified" so long as
courts avoid a result which is harsh, oppressive or unjust.'8
Since the Atlas Travel Service, Inc. decision, almost three dozen
Florida appellate decisions have attempted to define the scope and
12. Flammer v. Patton, 245 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. 1971); United Loan Corp. v. Weddle, 77
So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1955) (Drew, J., dissenting).
13. FLA. STAT. § 542.12(1) (1979).
14. FLA. STAT. § 542.12(2) (1979).
15. Standard Newspaper, Inc. v. Woods, 110 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1959).
16. 98 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
17. Id. at 818.
18. Id.
1980]
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limitations of section 542.12(2). In these decisions, the courts have
strictly construed the words of the noncompetition contract.19 Nev-
ertheless, with respect to the statutory language which is in dero-
gation of common law, the courts have plainly taken a "broad view
of the statute's application."20
This expansive viewpoint has obviously favored an employer
seeking to hold a former employee to the promise not to compete.
Cases construing the statute have broadened its scope, have al-
lowed few defenses, and have virtually mandated injunctive relief
to remedy violations.
III. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
A. Section 542.12(2) as the Exclusive Basis for Enforcing
Noncompetition Agreements
Florida's provision for noncompetition agreements is not
presented as a separate, affirmative statutory authorization. In-
stead, it is cast as an exception to the general prohibition against
trade restraints contained in section 542.12(1). Accordingly, Flor-
ida courts have said in dictum that restrictive covenants not ex-
pressly embraced by the "savings" clause of section 542.12(2) will
be voided by the blanket proscription of section 542.12(1).21 Under
this view, therefore, section 542.12(2) merely provides an exclusive
basis for relief. Hence, the question becomes whether a contract
which impedes or restrains a former employee from exercising his
lawful profession, trade or business falls within the ambit of sub-
section two and conforms with the requirement of reasonable limi-
tations as to time and area. 22
Unfortunately, the statute does not exclusively support this
view.23 In 1976, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed rele-
vant Florida case law to conclude that section 542.12 is not "an
exclusive list of non-competition [agreements] that do not contra-
19. See, e.g., Storz Broadcasting Co. v. Courtney, 178 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1965). In Storz, the court emphasized the restraint of trade and personal liberty imposed by
such agreements and ruled that they could not be extended "further than the language of
the contract absolutely requires." Id. at 42.
20. Flammer v. Patton, 245 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. 1971).
21. E.g., Cerniglia v. C & D Farms, Inc., 203 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1967) (because the contract
was not "reasonable" within the meaning of the statute, it was held unenforceable); Bergh v.
Stephens, 175 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (since the profession of medicine is
not encompassed by "business," a covenant by a doctor fell without the statute and was
unenforceable).
22. Flammer v. Patton, 245 So. 2d 854, 858 (Fla. 1971).
23. See id. at 857.
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vene [Florida] public policy."" Instead, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded the statutory scheme merely reflects Florida's public policy
that a satisfactory noncompetition agreement be reasonable.2 6 Ad-
mittedly, it is presently unclear whether section 542.12(2) provides
the exclusive basis to seek enforcement of a noncompetition agree-
ment or whether it reflects the underlying policy that an agree-
ment be reasonable. To date, no dispositive ruling provides an an-
swer. In any event, courts have generally avoided the issue of
exclusiveness by construing the words of section 542.12(2) with
enough breadth to bring particular agreements within its
purview s6
B. Working for Another as Constituting "Engaging in a
Similar Business"
Despite early confusion on the subject, "[ilt is now established
that accepting employment in a similar business falls within the
term 'engaging in a similar business' as used in the statute, and
therefore is within the exceptions stated in [section] 542.12(2). '"27
Furthermore, in Hunter v. North American Biologicals, Inc.,28 the
Third District Court of Appeal concluded that accepting a position
with a competitor different from that held with the first employer
did not free the employee from the reach of section 542.12(2).
Rather, the court noted that the trial court retained the discretion
to determine whether the "similarity of positions" would adversely
affect the court's ability to enforce a noncompetition agreement.2
C. Scope of "One Who Is Employed"
The statute validates noncompetition agreements signed by "one
who is employed" by the covenantor. Accordingly, in Economic Re-
search Analysts, Inc. v. Brennan,30 the defendant argued that be-
cause he had been merely an independent broker, rather than an
24. Wilkinson v. Manpower, Inc., 531 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 1976).
25. Id. at 715.
26. E.g., Economic Research Analysts, Inc. v. Brennan, 232 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1970). In Brennan, the court found the covenant to be within the terms of § 542.12(2),
"thus saving the agreement from the broad invalidating effect of Section 542.12(1)." Id. at
221.
27. Storz Broadcasting Co. v. Courtney, 178 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
See also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Lefkowitz, 169 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
28. 287 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
29. Id. at 728.
30. 232 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
19801
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employee of the plaintiff, he had never been employed by the
plaintiff for statutory purposes. The trial court agreed, and, finding
section 542.12(2) inapplicable, dismissed the complaint pursuant to
the broad proscription of section 542.12(1).sl
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the
plaintiff had exerted significant control over the former salesman.
Applying ordinary agency concepts, the court ruled that the defen-
dant had been the plaintiff's "agent," and was therefore "one who
[was] employed" for section 542.12(2) purposes. 2
While this case may stand on its particular facts, the court's
translation of "agent" into "one who is employed" is questionable.
The law recognizes various distinctions between an employment
relationship and an agency. 8 Presumably, the legislature under-
stood such differences. 8 4 Because an agency relationship can be
more limited than an employee-employer relationship, the statute
probably was not intended to protect noncompetition agreements
imposed upon an agent as opposed to a regular employee.
Less questionable is the other appellate construction of "one
who is employed" found in Brenner v. Barco Chemicals Division.3
In that case, the court ruled that a company's officer is "employed"
for purposes of enforcing any noncompetition agreements he might
execute.3 6
D. Professions as Constituting a Business
The conclusion that pursuing a profession was not tantamount
to engaging in a business was briefly popular. The First District
Court of Appeal in Bergh v. Stephens noted that: "Like the legal
profession, the medical profession has for centuries been regarded
and adjudicated to be a great and noble profession, as distin-
guished from a business, and it is so today. 3 7 This notion was for-
ever interred, however, by the 1970 Florida Supreme Court deci-
31. Id.
32. Id. at 221. See also Insurance Field Servs. v. White & White Inspection, 384 So. 2d
303, 307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
33. See 53 AM. JUR. 2d Master & Servant § 3 (1970); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 57 (5th
ed. 1979); 2 FLA. JUR. 2d Agency & Employment § 2, at 139-40 (1977).
34. See State Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Galilean Children's Home, 102 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1958); 30 FLA. Jtm. Statutes § 112, at 273-74, § 119, at 282-83 (1974).
35. 209 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
36. Id. at 278.
37. 175 So. 2d 787, 791 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965). Contra, White v. Allen, 232 So. 2d
766 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (term "business" includes a profession or a trade).
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sion in Akey v. Murphy3 8 In that decision, the court held the
business-profession distinction to be inapposite when enforcing a
noncompetition agreement.3 9
E. "Similar Business"
Few operative words of section 542.12 allow greater flexibility
of construction than those referring to the statute's applicability to
an employee engaging in a "similar business" to that of his former
employer. 0 Recognizing the imprecision inherent in such wording,
appellate decisions have entrusted interpretation of this section of
the statute to the lower tribunals: "The trial court has jurisdiction
to determine the issue of the similarity of positions and, in its dis-
cretion, to enforce the covenant in respect thereto."" While no
Florida case has further defined a test for "similarity of position,"
a Georgia court sensibly suggested such criteria as the applicability
of similar skills and experience, and, compellingly, whether the
same customers would be natural objects of the two "similar"
businesses. 2
In substance, the "similarity" problem probably restates the
question of whether two businesses are "competing;" a question
earlier Florida courts have considered. Before Florida's enactment
of section 542.12, the Florida Supreme Court in Wilson v. Pigue43
imparted a functional analysis to the question of competition.
"[T]he test appears to be that the injury begins when the scope
and character of the employment by the rival business is such as to
result in substantial interference with the business being the sub-
38. 238 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1970).
39. Id. at 96-97.
40. FLA. STAT. § 542.12(2) (1979).
41. Hunter v. North American Biologicals, Inc., 287 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1974).
42. Edwards v. Howe Richardson Scale Co., 229 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1976). See also Mono-
gram Indus., Inc. v. Sar Indus., Inc., 134 Cal. Rptr. 714, 719 (Ct. App. 1976), in which the
court said:
That section permits a covenant not to engage in a business "similar" to the one
sold. . . . The buyer's business need not use the same name or similar organiza-
tion. . . . The language of the section insures that the competition is in fact such
and not simply insubstantial and infrequent or isolated transactions.
The words of this California court are especially important in light of Flammer v. Patton,
245 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1971). In Flammer, the Florida Supreme Court noted that Florida's
statute was patterned after provisions of California and Oklahoma law. Accordingly, court
decisions from those states, even those rendered after Florida adopted the statute, were
considered by the court when rendering a decision. Id. at 859.
43. 10 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1942) (injunction sought against former owner of business by
party purchasing it from him).
1980]
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ject of the contract."4 4 This prestatutory standard of "substantial
interference" seems well suited to guide the trial court's finding as
to "similarity of positions."
A further dimension to the definition of "similarity" was added
recently in a brief opinion of the Third District Court of Appeal.
In Puga v. Suave Shoe Corp.,45 the appellant challenged an injunc-
tion issued in favor of an employer who was preparing to launch a
business activity "similar" to that being pursued by his former em-
ployee. With little elaboration, the court, affirming the trial court's
decision, stated the trial court was acting within its discretion.46
This result is consistent with the policy whereby the trial courts
are generally left to decide the question of similarity.
F. Whether "Unreasonable" Agreements Are Within the Scope
of Section 542.12
The most persistently litigated issue with regard to the scope
of section 542.12(2) arises from its sanction of noncompetition
agreements for a "reasonably limited time and area."4  Because
courts have assumed that only noncompetition agreements within
the specific terms of the statute can be enforced, several cases
have held that unreasonably broad agreements fall beyond the sav-
ings clause of section 542.12(2) and, thus, are wholly void.50
44. Id. at 563.
45. 374 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
46. At the trial court level, Suave Shoe was No. 78-20720 (CA07) in the General Juris-
diction Division of Dade Circuit Court.
47. See Hunter v. North American Biologicals, Inc., 287 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1974). A more specific test for determining when preparatory activity is "similar"
to operations actually underway has been enunciated by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York: "Mere planning may not in itself constitute competi-
tion. But where, as here, affirmative steps are taken which go beyond the planning stage,
planning ripens into actual competition." De Long Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1960). Compare Orkin Exterminating Co. v.
Dewberry, 51 S.E.2d 669 (Ga. 1949) (preparation to expand into new territory, not new busi-
ness) with United Aircraft Corp. v. Boreen, 413 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1969) (corporation seeks
recovery of damages from former employees); and Waterfield Mortg. Co. v. O'Connor, 361
N.E.2d 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (employment agreement contemplated expansion of busi-
ness activity throughout the state). See also Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F.
Supp. 838 (D. Conn. 1976).
48. FLA. STAT. § 542.12(2) (1979).
49. See note 21 supra.
50. Forrest v. Kornblatt, 328 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Sanford Indus.,
Inc. v. Jaghory, 223 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); C & D Farms, Inc. v. Cerniglia,
189 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), afl'd, 203 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1967). See also Davis v.
EBSCO Industries, Inc., 150 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (apparently did not
void entire covenant; court merely declined to give it further effect).
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The most significant of these rulings came with the 1967 Florida
Supreme Court decision in Cerniglia v. C & D Farms, Inc.51 With
no statement of its rationale, the court affirmed a trial court find-
ing that the noncompetition agreement was "too extensive, both as
to time and area" to be given any force or effect.2 The time re-
striction in Cerniglia, however, covered a twenty-year period and
the area restriction encompassed all of the United States."s
Although cases such as Cerniglia have not been expressly over-
ruled, they stand at odds with the current rule expressed in the
1971 Florida Supreme Court decision of Flammer v. Patton.2 In
Flammer, a former employee of a finance company was allegedly
competing with his old employer in violation of a restrictive conve-
nant. In mandating enforcement, the court said:
[I]t is within the discretion of the trial court to determine what
limitations as to time and area would be reasonable under the
circumstances .... [Ojffending contracts of this nature [are]
void only to the extent that they do not meet the requirement of
reasonable limitation contained in subsection 2 of the statute.55
Following this decision, appellate courts now almost invariably
hold potentially unreasonable agreements enforceable, but con-
strue them narrowly.
Despite a number of similar pronouncements which follow the
rule of Flammer, a 1976 third district decision seems to reflect the
otherwise discarded notion that unreasonable covenants are wholly
unenforceable. Forrest v. Kornblatt56 presents a terse affirmance of
a ruling that the subject restrictive covenant failed to be "con-
scionable and. . . reasonably limited in time and area." This opin-
ion, which cited no recent precedent, is probably an aberration. At
the present time, the prevailing rule permits enforcement of unrea-
sonable agreements within reasonable limitations.
51. 203 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1967) (involving restrictive covenant signed by former owner in
favor of purchaser of business).
52. C & D Farms v. Cerniglia, 189 So. 2d 384, 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), af/d, 203
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1967).
53. Id.
54. 245 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1971).
55. Id. at 859.
56. 328 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
19801
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G. Applicability of Section 542.12 to Parties Other Than
Original Parties to Noncompetition Agreements
Although by its terms the statute applies only to the original
parties to the agreement, attempts have been made to broaden its
applicability to other parties affected by the noncompetition agree-
ment. Courts have considered whether only the original employer
can enforce the agreement as well as whether only the original cov-
enanting former employee can be subject to its enforcement.
Turning to the first issue, it appears that the enforcing party
must have some direct relationship with the covenantor before the
benefit of section 542.12 can be claimed. In 1975, in Manpower,
Inc. v. Olsten Permanent Agency,57 the Second District Court of
Appeal ruled that section 542.12 "cannot be extended to permit a
third party beneficiary to enforce a covenant not to compete.""
Previously, in Nenow v. L. C. Cassidy & Son, Inc.,6 the same court
found noncompetition agreements assignable, but in doing so, em-
phasized that subsequent to the assignment, the assignee had oper-
ated directly with the covenanting employee. 60 Thus, a direct rela-
tionship was created and was presumably accepted by the
employee that was absent in the third party beneficiary case.6" Ex-
trapolating from both holdings, it would appear that a successor or
assignee who never enjoyed any direct relationship with an em-
ployee could not enforce a noncompetition agreement against him.
On the other hand, the First District Court of Appeal ruled that
a noncompetition agreement can be enforced not only against the
competing employee, but also against his privies. In Temporarily
Yours-Temporary Help Services, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 2 a for-
mer employee of the plaintiff formed a rival corporation becoming
its president and sole operating officer. The court found the non-
competition agreement enforceable against both the individual and
the corporation. The court ruled that such covenants were chargea-
ble against parties to the contract and "also [against] those identi-
fied with them in interest, in privity with them, represented by
them or subject to their control.""
Adopting a contradictory position, the fourth district ruled in U
57. 309 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
58. Id. at 59.
59. 141 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
60. Id. at 639.
61. Id.
62. 377 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
63. Id. at 827.
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Shop Rite, Inc. v. Richard's Paint Manufacturing Co." that
agents, servants and/or employees of the culprit cannot be en-
joined when they are "persons other than those party to the con-
tract."65 The U Shop Rite, Inc. dictum cannot be reconciled with
the subsequent holding of Temporarily Yours, and its lack of de-
tail impedes clear definition of its holding. It is difficult to support
the U Shop Rite, Inc. opinion if it forbids injunctions directed to
parties who induce an ex-employee's breach of a noncompetition
agreement. Certainly inducing a breach of contract is actionable."
As long as the agents or privies of the party in breach are properly
named defendants, there is no reason why they should not be sub-
ject to injunction against inducing and participating in breaches of
a noncompetition agreement. Presumably, the legislature intended
to prevent such abuses, and the first district's view is more consis-
tent with such an intent.
IV. DEFENSES TO ENFORCEMENT
A. Harshness, Oppression or Offense to Public Policy
Assuming that a particular noncompetition agreement is within
the scope of section 542.12(2), relatively few defenses may be
raised as complete bars to its enforcement. Although courts have
generally ruled that "unreasonable" agreements cannot be wholly
invalidated, dicta in various cases suggest that truly egregious cir-
cumstances may warrant the wholesale obliteration of those cove-
nants.6 7 Such circumstances may include an "overriding public in-
terest in having the restricted employee's services available" or a
truly harsh and oppressive result threatening the former
employee."
While the precise contours of this defense are unclear, it seems
certain that "a general finding that enforcement will produce 'un-
just results' " will not suffice.' An illustration of circumstances
that will warrant invalidation is found in comparing two cases con-
sidering covenants restricting employment of doctors.
In Hefelfinger v. David,7 0 the First District Court of Appeal af-
64. 369 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
65. Id. at 1034.
66. Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1967).
67. See, e.g., Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 183 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1966);
Atlas Travel Serv. v. Morelly, 98 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
68. Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 183 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1966).
69. Barco Chems. Div., Inc. v. Colton, 296 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
70. 305 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
1980]
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firmed a trial court enforcement of a two-year noncompetition
agreement in the Escambia County area against an Escambia
County doctor. Although the court found that there was a need for
pediatricians in the Pensacola area, it held that restraining the
doctor from practice would not jeopardize the public health.
In a Third District Court of Appeal case, however, an attempt to
exclude a medical doctor from practice in the Florida Keys met a
different result. In Damsey v. Mankowitz,71 the noncompetition
agreement required the doctor to avoid practicing medicine be-
tween Boca Chica Key and Plantation Key for three years after
termination of his employment.7 In that case, the court reasoned:
The testimony also revealed a compelling need for defendant's
services as a surgeon in the area and enforcement of the covenant
would jeopardize the public health of the community. We con-
clude that under the circumstances the restrictive covenant in
this agreement is unduly harsh and oppressive and affirm the ap-
pealed order.78
To date, this is the only Florida case which has affirmed the in-
validation of a covenant based on public policy, or the need to
avoid a harsh or oppressive result. Comparing Hefelfinger to Dam-
sey deomonstrates that the standard for complete invalidation is
jeopardy to the public welfare, a hard test to meet.
B. Contract Breach or Discharge by the Employer as an
Employee's Defense to a Noncompetition Action
Florida has recently adopted the general rule providing that an
employer who has breached his agreement may not enforce the
noncompetition agreement against the employee. A Texas court
states the rule as follows:
It is well settled that an employer cannot wrongfully breach a
provision of an employment contract that is favorable to the em-
ployee (such as reducing his wages without his consent and with-
out contractual authority to do so) and then go into a court of
equity to secure, by injunction, the enforcement of another provi-
sion favorable to it.74
71. 339 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
72. Id. at 283.
73. Id.
74. Norris, Inc. v. Gafas, 562 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
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This traditional principle is an adjunct of the equitable "clean
hands" maxim.75 The principle was apparently adopted by the
First District Court of Appeal in the 1979 decision of Troup v.
Heacock.76 The facts of Troup are laced with unconscionability.
Robert Troup, an insurance agent, entered an employment con-
tract to represent an insurance company. The contract provided a
weekly draw of $125 for Troup, no specific training for him, no
express requirement that a quota of insurance be sold by Troup
and a noncompetition agreement covering the Volusia-Flagler
county area for three years. The insurance company unilaterally
reduced the weekly draw to $50 and finally fired Troup for reasons
known only to his employer.77 Finding that the employer had
breached the agreement by reducing the employee's draw, the dis-
trict court reversed the trial court's order enforcing the restrictive
covenant while calling it "inverse peonage."7
The ruling in Troup recognizes the doctrine that an employer
wrongfully discharging a worker may not thereafter restrain him
from competition. If an employee's discharge is unaccompanied by
wrongful conduct, however, Florida law is less clear. In all likeli-
hood, it appears that a guiltless employer may discharge an em-
ployee and still prevent his competition. Two factors support this
conclusion. First, absent employer wrongdoing, no case has based
the enforceability of agreements upon the nature of the discharge
and frequently they do not even indicate whether a worker quit or
was fired.7 Second, in the previously discussed Hefelfinger case,
where an employee's discharge was considered, the appellate court
enforced the noncompetition agreement in its entirety.80
Nevertheless, the issue is not free from doubt. A Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeal's decision construing Florida law declined to en-
force a noncompetition agreement based on the employer's act of
termination even though no breach of contract by the employer
was indicated. The court stated:
The no-competition clause was an integral part of the consultant
75. 27 AM. JuR. 2d Equity §§ 136-44 (1966); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 227 (5th ed. 1979);
30 C.J.S. Equity §§ 93-99 (1965); 12 FLA. JuR. Equity §§ 54-58 (1957).
76. 367 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
77. Id. at 692.
78. Id.
79. See sources cited in note 88 infra. See also Beiley, Wagner & Assoc., Inc. v. Wagner,
238 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (injunction denied when employee withdrew as
employee and began to compete with former employer).
80. 305 So. 2d at 823.
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contract and did not stand independently of it.... [W]hen
Orkin terminated the agreement, rather than terminating Kaye's
employment, it also terminated the no-competition requirement
contained in the agreement. The clause ceased to have effect be-
cause the contract between the parties had ended."
This reasoning, asserted without authority, is unpersuasive for
two reasons. First, an employer who has complied with his contrac-
tual obligations should not forfeit those entitlements due him be-
cause he lawfully terminates one aspect of the bargain. A person
discontinuing an arrangement expects the consideration already
due as part of the agreement. Second, it would be unpractical to
make the determinative question whether a worker leaves his em-
ployment voluntarily or otherwise, since such an approach would
require extensive investigation of the circumstances surrounding
the employee's termination.
V. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER SECTION 542.12(2)
A. Availability of the Noncompete Injunction
When an agreement is embraced by section 542.12(2) and cannot
be voided through the use of an appropriate defense, then the
agreement can be enforced by injunctive relief. A court of compe-
tent jurisdiction is provided the discretionary power to grant an
injunction under section 542.12(2)(a).2 Such discretion, however,
has been subject to varying control by appellate courts. Although
the language of the section purports to confirm a continuing role
for trial court discretion when granting injunctions, appellate deci-
sions from the beginning have narrowly channeled such discretion.
In Atlas Travel Service, Inc., the court stated that any exercise of
discretion must not violate the object of the statute.83 Other appel-
late holdings" following Atlas Travel Service culminated in the
1974 Florida Supreme Court pronouncement in Miller Mechanical,
Inc. v. Ruth,85 that although a court can award breach of contract
damages in a noncompetition agreement violation situation, "the
normal remedy is to grant an injunction." The court premised this
81. Kaye v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 472 F.2d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 1973).
82. FLA. STAT. § 542.12(2)(a) (1979).
83. 98 So. 2d at 818.
84. See Barco Chems. Div., Inc. v. Colton, 296 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
Data Supplies, Inc. v. Cowart, 240 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Tasty Box
Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 1960).
85. 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974).
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conclusion on the realization that it is difficult to ascertain what
damages have been suffered by the employer as a result of the em-
ployee's breach.86 Indeed, in sharp contrast to the usual appellate
deference to trial court injunctive discretion, roughly a dozen Flor-
ida appellate cases have reversed lower court refusals to grant in-
junctive relief.8 7
Correspondingly, trial court orders granting injunctive enforce-
ment of noncompetition agreements have almost invariably been
affirmed. In some instances, the entitlement to injunction can be
adjudicated in summary judgment.8 8 The only appellate reversal of
an injunctive grant was the previously discussed Troup v. Heacock
case. In Troup, the court's ruling did not reach the propriety of
injunctive remedy because it found no liability. That decision held
that because the employer had already breached the contract, the
competing employee was not bound to the noncompetition clause
in the contract.89 Thus, even this unusual case does not conflict
with the mainstream conclusion that an injunction is the presump-
tively valid remedy for noncompete violators.
In addition to confining the scope of trial court discretion, Flor-
ida case law has eroded another longstanding injunction principle.
In 1974, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the follow-
ing allegations stated a cause of action for injunctive relief under
section 542.12(2):
(a) The contract [was entered into].
(b) The appellant's intentional direct and material breach
thereof.
86. Id.
87. See Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1974); West Shore Restau-
rant Corp. v. Turk, 101 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1958); Empiregas, Inc. v. Thomas, 359 So. 2d 15
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Foster & Co. v. Snodgrass, 333 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1976); Royal Servs., Inc. v. Williams, 334 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 3d Diet. Ct. App. 1976); Auto
Club Affiliates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Lee v. Watsco,
Inc., 263 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Data Supplies, Inc. v. Cowart, 240 So. 2d
829 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Tasty Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1960). Cf. Pensacola Assocs. v. Biggs Sporting Goods Co., 353 So. 2d 944 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (trial court reversed in lessee noncompete case); Aid, Inc. v. Cavero,
386 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (sale of stock).
Despite the seemingly clear doctrine presented by such cases, trial courts continue to re-
sent noncompetition agreements leading to further reversals. Answer All Tel. Secretarial
Serv., Inc. v. Call 24 Inc., 381 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Chessick Clinic v.
Jones, 367 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
88. E.g., Maimone v. Wackenhut Corp., 329 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
89. 367 So. 2d at 691.
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(c) No adequate remedy except by injunctive relief.90
By endorsing this formulation, the court suggested that irreparable
harm is inherent in the breach of a noncompetition covenant and,
therefore, is not a necessary matter of pleading or proof. Similarly,
other courts have required only a clear showing that a reasonable
noncompetition agreement is being violated. "[It] is not essential
that the employer have some special or peculiar product, trade se-
cret, or unique device. . . .[W]here, as here, the violation is clear
. .. injunctive relief is appropriate and should be granted."91 By
focusing on the certainty of violation, cases seem to excuse the
need to establish any particular impending prejudice or "irrepara-
ble harm" to the employer. To the extent that irreparable harm
continues as a requisite for noncompetition injunctions, any such
requirement is evidently met as a matter of law.
Cutting against this trend are 1976 decisions of the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal which seem to restore trial court discretion
and irreparable harm as factors in the noncompetition injunction
case. In Damsey, the court mentioned usual maxims of equitable
discretion in approving the refusal to restrain a doctor from prac-
ticing medicine in the Florida Keys.'5 In Forrest v. Kornblatt, the
court affirmed without explanation a refusal for an injunction as
within the trial court's discretion."3
Also reaffirming the role of trial court discretion, the court in
Uni-Chem Corp. v. Maret"4 receded from any position that would
require a temporary injunction being issued before a chancellor
had an opportunity to exercise his discretion in a dispute. Addi-
tionally, the Uni-Chem Corp. decision revitalized another tenet of
injunctive relief; specifically, that irreparable harm would have to
be shown before a temporary injunction could be issued. 95 Argua-
bly, however, these pronouncements are limited to proceedings for
preliminary relief. The Uni-Chem Corp. court recognized that it
90. Hunter v. North American Biologicals, Inc., 287 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1974). See also Puga v. Suave Shoe Corp., 374 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
In Puga, the court ruled that any irreparable harm requirement would necessarily be satis-
fied in noncompetition cases because monetary damages would typically be difficult to as-
certain and, hence, no adequate remedy would be available apart from an injunction.
91. Foster & Co. v. Snodgrass, 333 So. 2d 521, 522-23 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (em-
phasis added).
92. 339 So. 2d at 282.
93. 328 So. 2d at 529.
94. 338 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
95. Id. at 887.
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was dealing with a request for a temporary injunction. The case
had not yet proceeded to a full hearing and not all of the evidence
had been presented to the court. 6 Fortifying the suggestion that
Uni-Chem Corp. speaks only to temporary injunctions is the fact
that any extension of such principles to final injunction cases
would squarely conflict with the Florida Supreme Court ruling in
Miller Mechanical, Inc. which supported the granting of an
injunction. 7
Even if restricted to preliminary injunctions, the Uni-Chem
Corp. reasoning is suspect. Although the proferred distinction is
consonant with ordinary proceedings in equity, it has no precedent
in section 542.12 litigation. Indeed, the third district itself, in
Tasty Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy,98 had previously reversed a trial
court refusal to grant temporary relief without distinguishing be-
tween temporary and permanent injunctions. In Tasty Box Lunch
Co., an order of the chancellor denied the employer's application
for a temporary injunction. The denial was premised on the une-
qual bargaining positions of the employer and employee and a lack
of consideration on the part of the employer for the employee's
noncompetition agreement. The agreement required the employee
not to compete for six months in the territory last worked by the
employee prior to his discharge. The third district, disagreeing, re-
versed and remanded. The court concluded that an unequal bar-
gaining position was an inadequate basis to void the agreement,
since all noncompetition agreements would probably be voided if
an equal bargaining position was required. Also, the court found
that the employer's promise to pay commissions-was sufficient con-
sideration for the employee's agreement. There was no distinction
made by the court, however, between temporary and permanent
injunctions." Moreover, if such a distinction were made in a non-
competition enforcement action it would ignore a critical reality
expressed in another third district case: "Cases of this kind should
be determined expeditiously, so as to prevent an employee's viola-
tion of such a contract to continue well into or beyond the non-
competition period thereof. Delay in enforcement can operate to
deprive the employer of the benefit of the contract." 100
Unless preliminarily enjoined, a former employee may continue
96. Id.
97. 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974).
98. Tasty Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
99. Id. at 53-54.
100. Royal Servs., Inc. v. Williams, 334 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
19801
744 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:727
illicit competition until final judgment is rendered. Final judgment
might easily occur after the period for noncompetition has expired.
Technically speaking, this need not moot the employer's injunctive
suit because the trial court could enjoin the competitive actions
from the date of judgment until the running of a period equal to
the originally prescribed term of noncompetition.10 1 As a practical
matter, however, such an injunction might come too late to prevent
a permanent loss of clientele, trade expertise, and other assets
which the noncompetition agreement sought to protect.
A final observation regarding the reach of Uni-Chem Corp. is
the court's insistence that it was merely affirming the "action of
the trial court [judge] on the record as was then presented to
him. ' 10 2 Although the facts of the case are not presented in detail,
it is clear that the decision deals with salesmen and not technicians
whose minds are crammed with freshly appropriated trade secrets.
Additionally, the noncompetition agreement provided for liqui-
dated damages. While a liquidated damages provision is not an ab-
solute bar to injunctive relief,10 3 it may be a factor weighing
against the need for an injunction.
So far, no decision other than Uni-Chem Corp. has espoused a
temporary-permanent injunction dichotomy in a noncompetition
enforcement action. Since the Florida Supreme Court and other
district courts have attached a presumptive force to the injunctive
remedy without making any such differentiation in these cases, it
is unclear whether Uni-Chem Corp. will emerge as a harbinger.
B. Prescribing the Scope of the Noncompete Injunction
Although the unreasonableness of a noncompetition agreement
does not necessarily take it beyond section 542.12(2), the reasona-
101. See Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 183 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1966). In Insurance
Field Servs. v. White & White Inspection, 384 So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980),
the court ruled that a suit for injunction became moot once the contract's period for non-
competition had expired. Similarly, in Royal Servs., Inc. v. Williams, 334 So. 2d 154, 157
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976), the court reversed a trial judge's denial of enforcement yet
declined to remand the case because the contract period for enforcement had expired. To
prevent such contracts from expiring during the pendency of an appeal after a trial court
refuses enforcement, the Third District Court of Appeal suggested application to the appel-
late court for interim injunctive relief. Id.
102. 338 So. 2d at 887. As of this writing, the most recent pronouncement by the Third
District Court of Appeal indicated that Uni-Chem Corp. will not be extended to permanent
injunctions. See Suave Shoe Corp. v. Fernandez, No. 80-503 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 2,
1980).
103. Beery v. Plastridge Agency, Inc., 142 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
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bleness of the agreement is a primary factor considered by the
courts when determining the scope of unjunctive relief to be
granted. 04 Reasonableness is primarily an issue for the trial court;
appellate courts almost never disturb orders that give at least par-
tial effect to noncompetition agreements.
Appellate court decisions nevertheless have provided some stan-
dards to guide lower court discretion. In general, the analysis for
delineating reasonableness is a familiar balancing test between the
employer's interest in preventing the competition and the oppres-
sive effect on the employee. 108 The court's analysis should begin
with consideration of the terms of the noncompetition agreement
contained in the employment contract."0 6 At the same time, the
court should focus on the limitations as to time and geographical
area as required by the statute. 0 7
After beginning with the terms of the agreement, the next step is
to determine whether the circumstances of the case mandate modi-
fication. 0 8 These circumstances can include facts developing after
the execution of the noncompetition agreement, such as the defen-
dant's subsequent ability to earn a living. 09
Another factor determining how long and to what extent non-
competition will be enforced is the voluntariness of the employee's
promise. To date, no court has ruled that an employee's lack of
bargaining power compels invalidation. As one court has stated:
"To hold that the agreement is unenforceable because the bargain-
ing parties were not all on equal terms would void nearly all such
agreements and this would defeat the purpose of the statute."' 10
On the other hand, in a case in which the employee willingly en-
tered into a noncompetition agreement, the court deemed this be-
havior to be "an important factor" favoring expansive enforce-
ment."' In that case, the court observed that restrictions found in
104. Availability, Inc. v. Riley, 336 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). See also
Akey v. Murphy, 238 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1970).
105. Miller Mechanical, Inc., 300 So. 2d at 12.
106. Flammer v. Patton, 245 So. 2d at 859.
107. Availability, Inc. v. Riley, 336 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
108. Id.
109. Compare American Bldg. Main Co. v. Fogelman, 167 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1964) ("unreasonable to enjoin a man from his livelihood for more than a year") with
Availability, Inc. v. Riley, 336 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (defendant "well able
to support himself and his family" notwithstanding injunction).
110. Tasty Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
111. Compare Auto Club Affiliates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So. 2d 239, 244 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1973) (injunctive relief to enforce restrictive covenant against competition) with
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Girardeau, 301 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (em-
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agreements entered into throughout the United States appeared to
be reasonable.
A further factor to be considered is the extent to which both the
employer and the employee had contact with the restricted terri-
tory. No case has enforced a restriction beyond the region in which
the employer actually did business.11 2 Conversely, a trial court's re-
fusal to enforce an agreement in the county in which eighty-five
percent of the employer's business was conducted was held to be
reversible error. 13
The previous contacts between the employee and the restricted
area are also important because if the employee does not have suf-
ficient contact with the entire territory over which the employer's
business extends, the noncompetition agreement might be unen-
forceable. " ' Thus, in Orkin Exterminating Co. v Girardeau," a
divided district court affirmed a trial court order limiting enforce-
ment of a seven-county noncompetition agreement to the San Jose
portion of Jacksonville. Although the employer operated through-
out the restricted territory, the employee's labors had been ex-
pended primarily in one area.
A final ingredient of section 542.12 injuction analysis is whether
trade secrets are implicated. This factor represents a valid business
concern fully recognized even before the statute's enactment." 6
No list of criteria can be exhaustive. Probably the closest any
court has come to summarizing the main components of this bal-
ancing analysis was the discussion in Akey v. Murphy that: "[T]he
restrictions were no greater than were necessary to protect peti-
tioners' legitimate interests, were not unduly harsh and oppressive
on the respondent, and were not injurious to the public
interest."'1 7
ployee told to accept noncompetition agreement or lose job).
Training is also an important factor. Cf. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Girardeau, 301 So. 2d
38 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (worker received only four hours of training from employer
seeking injunction).
112. See, e.g., U Shop Rite, Inc., 369 So. 2d at 1033.
113. Availability, Inc. v. Riley, 336 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
114. Auto Club Affiliates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So. 2d 239, 242 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1973).
115. 301 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
116. Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1960).
117. 238 So. 2d at 97.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Recent pronouncements by Florida courts suggest increasing re-
luctance to adhere to the rigid pattern of noncompetition agree-
ment enforcement mandated in such Florida Supreme Court deci-
sions as Akey v. Murphy and Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth.
District court opinions since 1974 have not applied the stringent
directives for enforcement called for by Miller Mechanical, Inc.
which represents the most current high court ruling in this field.
Moreover, the supreme court has not yet admonished such district
court behavior.
This mild appellate relaxation follows the longstanding and in-
variable reluctance of trial judges to impose injunctions that, in
practical effect, sentence a person to refrain from partaking in his
livelihood. Such manifestations of leniency are understandable.
The rigid rule of Miller Mechanical, Inc. seemingly offered no dis-
cretion for genuine hardship cases, while in Uni-Chem Corp., the
third district would return such discretion to the trial judge at
least at the preliminary injunction level.
The problem with the Uni-Chem Corp. holding, and the diffi-
culty apparently prompting the enactment of section 542.12, is
that discretionary enforcement generally translated into nonen-
forcement. After all, even though discretionary parameters have al-
ways been theoretically available to enforce noncompetition agree-
ments, the fact remains that no reported decision enforced one
until section 542.12 was passed. Both judges and legislators appar-
ently developed an all-or-nothing approach towards enforcing non-
competition agreements. A solution to this extreme approach can
be found in further judicial development of criteria for enforce-
ment previously referenced without elaboration in applicable cases.
As far back as the initial decision of Atlas Travel Service, Inc.,
courts have favored enforcement absent "harsh, oppressive or un-
just" consequences. Unfortunately, these vague terms have not
been further defined except for decisions declining enforcement
against a fired worker and against a doctor whose services were
urgently needed in the community.
The courts need to more specifically define the showing that
must be made to overcome a statutory presumption favoring en-
forcement. One example of such a sufficient showing should be the
inability of a worker to support a family if enjoined from a particu-
lar occupation in a particular region. While such a standard might
seem difficult to define, it seems no more problematic than inquir-
ies into improverishment or financial ability made in other con-
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texts of the law.
Another criterion worth further development is the extent to
which an employee has voluntarily entered into a noncompetition
agreement. Courts have previously refused to invalidate agree-
ments on this basis by reasoning that unequal bargaining power is
the unfortunate but inevitable reality behind each employee's cov-
enant not to compete.11 8 Minimally, however, courts could insist
that such agreements appear conspicuously in any writings signed
by the employee. Indeed, such agreements are at least as impor-
tant as disclaimers of warranty which must be in bold face type to
be effective.
Other factors in addition to financial hardship and voluntariness
should be developed in specific terms by judicial or legislative clas-
sification. Only through such definition can courts avoid an all-or-
nothing approach to enforcement while giving life to the unmistak-
able legislative mandate for presumptive enforcement.
118. Tasty Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
